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INTRoDUCrION"'
In this installment of the Survey, significant developments in the
expansion of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. are considered. Among the
The following abbreviations will be used uniformly throughout the Survey:
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules .................................... CPLR
New York Civil Practice Act ................................................ CPA
New York Rules of Civil Practice ............................................ RCP
New York City Civil Court Act ............................................. CCA
Uniform District Court Act ............................................... UDCA
Uniform Justice Court Act ................................................ UJCA
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cases treated is Adams v. Lindsay, wherein a lower New York court
deemed full satisfaction of the main judgment to be a condition pre-
cedent to collection of a third-party claim. In Lastowski v. Norge Coin-
O-Matic, Inc. and Ryan v. Fahey, both the Second and Fourth Depart-
ments of the Appellate Division refused to recognize negligent super-
vision as a tort where asserted against a parent as a third-party defen-
dant.
Other cases discussed herein include Rivera v. Berkeley Super
Wash, Inc., an Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decision con-
struing Codling v. Paglia as having recognized a separate cause of action
in strict tort liability and applying to it the tort statute of limitations,
running from the date of injury; Jacox v. Jacox, wherein the Second
Department overruled Vanderpool v. Vanderpool which had held that
an indigent defendant in a matrimonial action had a constitutional
right to counsel; and Kane v. Randt, which extended the rule of
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital to require a
defendant-physician to testify as an expert witness at an examination
before trial. Additionally, the Survey notes New York's continued re-
sponse to the mandates of the United States Supreme Court in the field
of creditor prejudgment remedies. In Long Island Trust Co. v. Porta
Aluminum Corp., the Appellate Division, Second Department, using
the test of Fuentes v. Shevin, sustained the constitutionality of CPLR
7102 in the face of renewed attack.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less im-
Uniform City Court Act ................................................... UCCA
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ............................... RPAPL
Domestic Relations Law .................................................... DRL
WENsTEN, KORN & MILm, NEW YoRx Civm PaAcnrcE (1973) ................ WK&M
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice ...................... The Biannual Survey
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice ...................... The Quarterly Survey
The Survey of New York Practice .......................................... The Survey
Extremely valuable in understanding the CPLR are the five reports of the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure. They are contained in the following legislative
documents and will be cited as follows:
1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6(b) ...................................... Fnsr REP.
1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13 ..................................... SEcoND REP.
1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17 ...................................... TBna REP.
1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 80 ..................................... FOURTH Rap.
1961 FINAL REPORT OF TnE ADVISORy CoMnirrrE
ON PRACTICE AN PROCEDURE ..................................... FINAL REP.
Also valuable are the two joint reports of the Senate Finance and Assembly Ways and
Means Committees:
1961 N.Y. IG. Doc. No. 15 ....................................... FnIi REP.
1962 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 8 ........................................ SXTH REP.
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portant, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. It is
hoped that the Survey nonetheless accomplishes its basic purpose, viz.,
to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural
law of New York.
ARTICLE 1 - SHORT TIT=E, APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS
CPLR 105(j): Age of majority changed to eighteen.
The Legislature has added a new subdivision (j) to CPLR 105.
This subdivision defines the words "infant" and "infancy" when used
within the context of the CPLR. Under the new definitions, an infant
is one who has not yet attained the age of eighteen.'
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 214: Tort statute of limitations adopted for strict products lia-
bility.
The scope of recovery for personal injury and property damage
caused by a defective product has been greatly expanded since Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 eliminated the requirement of privity in
negligence actions. Although this right of recovery predicated upon
negligence is well settled, it may provide inadequate protection in cer-
tain instances." Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals has seen fit
I N.Y. Sass. LAWs [1974], ch. 924, § 1 (McKinney).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 INN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
8 Recovery predicated upon a negligence theory may be had only if the following
elements can be proven: (1) the plaintiff is within the category of persons to whom the
manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable care, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916); (2) the manufacturer did not use such care; and (3) the
negligently caused defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See W. PnossER,
LAw op ToPrs 143, 641 (Hornbook ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROssER]. The plaintiff
may rely on res ipsa loquitur as an aid in proving negligence, but such proof may be
difficult, or even impossible, particularly where a manufacturer can demonstrate that he
generally used reasonable care throughout the manufacturing process. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 612 INs. L.J. 141, 142 (1974). See also Velez v.
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978)
(per curiam) (plaintiff's suit dismissed in negligence but upheld on the theory of strict
products liability); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.YS.2d 461
(1973), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 616 (1974) (jury found
manufacturer free from negligence, but rendered verdict for the plaintiff on the theory
of extended breach of warranty).
An even greater burden is imposed upon a plaintiff choosing, instead, to rely on the
traditional cause of action for breach of warranty. He must prove: (I) contractual privity
between himself and the seller; (2) the contract contained express or implied warranties
not effectively disdaimed; (3) the defect causing the injury was a breach of the warranty;
and (4) the defect proximately caused the injury. See N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (McKinney
1964). Broad disdaimers and adherence to privity requirements serve to limit the effective-
ness of these Code provisions in protecting the consumer.
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